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Environmental uncertainty can render managerial decision-
making about resource deployment particularly difficult.
Integrating the knowledge-based view of the firm and the
organizational learning literature, we make a case for
deploying specific knowledge-based resources to cope with
specific types of environmental uncertainty. We unbundle
knowledge-based resources into technology-based and
social-network-based resources and, using Milliken’s
(1987) typology of environmental uncertainty, we hypothe-
size that (a) technological exploration will be more effective
during state uncertainty and (b) while being generally
beneficial, social exploration will prove more effective
during response uncertainty. An analysis of the financial
performance of information technology (IT) firms in the
United States over the period 1995–2004 generally supports
our hypotheses. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords: environmental uncertainty, exploration, organi-
zational learning, knowledge-based viewRésumé
L’incertitude environnementale peut rendre la prise de déci-
sion managériale concernant le déploiement des ressources
particulièrement difficile. Combinant la perspective de
l’entreprise basée sur le savoir et les travaux en apprentissage
organisationnel, cet article est en faveur du déploiement des
ressources spécifiques basées sur le savoir pour faire face à
des types spécifiques d’incertitude environnementale. Nous
divisons les ressources basées sur le savoir en ressources
basées sur la technologie et en ressources basées sur le réseau
social et, nous appuyant sur la typologie de Milliken (1987)
sur l’incertitude environnementale, nous posons comme hy-
pothèse que (a) l’exploration technologique est plus efficace
pendant l’incertitude étatique, et (b) quoique généralement
avantageuse, l’exploration sociale est plus efficace pendant
l’incertitude de la réponse. Une analyse de la performance
financière des firmes de la technologie de l’information (IT)
aux États-Unis de 1995 à 2004 montre que l’exploration
technologique menée à travers l’investissement en R et D est
positivement reliée à la performance financière de la firme
en période d’incertitude étatique, mais non pas en période
d’incertitude de la réponse. Par ailleurs, l’impact de l’exploration
sociale sur la performance financière de la firme en période
d’incertitude de la réponse produit des résultats plutôt mitigés.
Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Mots-clés : incertitude environnementale, exploration,
apprentissage organisationnel, perspective basée sur le
savoir, point chaudGlobalization, rapid technological advances, intense
competitive rivalry, and ever-changing regulatory regimes
can all combine to make business environments highlyuncertain. Firms attempt to cope by creating, extending,
and modifying or reconfiguring their resource base
(Helfat et al., 2007) depending on how they perceive envi-
ronmental uncertainty. In other words, environmental uncer-
tainty can influence the way firms deploy their resources.
The resource deployment decisions made by firms are perhaps
best captured by March’s (1991) succinct taxonomy, which
describes such decisions as being either exploration- orCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.exploitation-oriented. Exploration entails allocating resources
in "pursuit of new knowledge," whereas exploitation involves
the "use and development of things already known."
(Levinthal & March, 1993, p. 105). The literature, however,
asserts that firms need to be ambidextrous—that is, firms must
be adept at both exploring and exploiting knowledge-based
resources (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), and vary the
amount of emphasis they place on either exploration or ex-
ploitation depending on the context (Lavie, Stettner, &
Tushman, 2010). The important question therefore is: Under
what context or contingency do firms benefit from deploying
resources primarily for exploration, and when do they benefit
from exploiting their knowledge-based resources? Since the
extant literature does not adequately address this question
(Lavie et al., 2010; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013), we attempt
to provide a partial answer.
Our answer is partial in the sense that we focus only on
exploration. We do so for two reasons. Firstly, exploration,
by definition, is critical to the ability of firms to innovate,
and it is widely acknowledged that firms must continually in-
novate if they are to sustain their competitive advantage (Sosa,
2013). Secondly, exploratory activities have proven more
effective during periods of uncertainty than during periods of
stability (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Matusik
& Fitza, 2012; Sidhu, Volberda, & Commandeur, 2004). In
current times, firms operate in an increasingly uncertain envi-
ronment and must necessarily focus on exploration. Although
scholars have studied the link between environmental uncer-
tainty and resource deployment, they have generally made
coarse-grained distinctions among time periods. For exam-
ple, they have differentiated between “stable and unstable”
periods and overlooked the fact that there are different types
of uncertainty (exceptions include Ashill & Jobber, 2010;
Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; McKelvie, Haynie,
& Gustavsson, 2011; Miller & Shamsie, 1999). As explained
below, there may be merit in focusing on different types of
uncertainty in the resource allocation context.
Milliken (1987) conceptualized uncertainty as a multi-
faceted construct and identified three distinct types of uncer-
tainty: (i) state uncertainty, which makes it difficult to
discern what is going on and therefore renders predictions
about the future state of the world suspect; (ii) effect uncer-
tainty, which makes it difficult to predict the impact of the
environmental changes on one’s organization; and (iii)
response uncertainty, which makes it difficult to predict the
organizational consequences of a particular response/action.
Although enhancing organizational performance remains the
central concern of strategy (see Crossan & Apaydin, 2010;
Urgal, Quintas, & Arevalo-Tome, 2013), empirical studies
that explain how environmental aspects impact exploratory
and exploitative strategies on organizational performance
are scarce (Jansen et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010). In this
paper, we attempt to advance the current understandings of
the impact of resource deployment decisions by linking
Milliken’s (1987) concepts of state and response uncertaintyCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.to specific exploratory strategies and by studying their
effects on organizational performance.
While we note that dynamic environments render
existing products and services obsolete (Jansen et al.,
2006) and that firms in general are said to benefit from rely-
ing on exploration during uncertainty (Miller & Shamsie,
1996; Sidhu et al., 2004), we concur with the view that
“exploration” as defined in the extant literature is much too
broad and does not lend itself to being operationalized and
measured with precision (Lavie et al., 2010). We argue that,
just as there are different types of uncertainty, there are dif-
ferent types of exploration. Differentiating amongst explor-
atory activities could facilitate our understanding of how
exploration adds value to the firm. We turn to Milliken’s
(1987) framework to provide a sound theoretical rationale
for establishing linkages between types of uncertainty,
specific exploratory strategies, and firm-level performance
outcomes. We unbundle exploratory knowledge-based
resources into (a) technology-based resources (i.e., techno-
logical exploration as typified by research and development
or R&D activity), and (b) social-network based resources
(i.e., social exploration as typified by organizational attempts
to leverage managerial and interfirm networks into commer-
cialization opportunities). We later contend that there are the-
oretical reasons to favour technological exploration during
state uncertainty and social exploration during response un-
certainty. We also provide some empirical evidence to sup-
port our arguments by linking the two kinds of exploration
to the performance of information technology (IT) firms
located in geographical hot spots and those located outside
hot spots in the US. Our data belong to the predotcom
(1995–1998) and postdotcom (2001–2004) bubble periods.
We argue that the two periods may reasonably be seen as
respectively reflecting state and response uncertainty.
We demonstrate a method that obviates the need to rely
on subjective judgments to measure different states of
uncertainty and resource deployment decisions. Our study
advances the organizational learning literature and the
knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm by providing
evidence that deploying specific knowledge-based resources
during specific types of environmental uncertainty
(Milliken, 1987) positively impacts firm performance.Hypotheses Development
Uncertainty and Knowledge-Based Resources
The role of uncertainty is fundamental to the field of
strategic management since it affects the response of
organizations, particularly the strategic decision making
of top managers (Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011).
The more important strategic decisions pertain to attempts
by managers to create rents by deploying resources more
effectively than the competition (Makadok, 2001). It isCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
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decisions, while necessary for competitive advantage, are
not sufficient. The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm
draws attention to the characteristics of the resources pos-
sessed by the firms. Competitive advantage derives from
uniquely endowed tangible or intangible resources—that is,
from resources that are valuable, rare, and hard to imitate
or substitute (Barney, 1991). A variant of the RBV is the
knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996),
which essentially implies that knowledge-based resources
confer competitive advantage because they cannot be easily
imitated. Knowledge-based resources are said to be com-
prised of skillsets that enable firms to "adapt their products
to market needs and to deal with competitive challenges"
(emphasis added; Miller & Shamsie, 1996, p. 522).
Adaption implies the ability to achieve congruence with
the changing business environment.
The KBV thus implies that knowledge-based resources
can confer competitive advantage only if deployed appropri-
ately (i.e., in congruence with the external environment).
The KBV’s fundamental premises may be summarized as
follows: (a) firms are complex social communities that
manage knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996); (b)
knowledge is the key resource that impacts firm performance
(Grant, 1996); (c) knowledge can be integrated only by a
firm and not an industry (Grant, 1996); (d) benefitting from
knowledge requires organizations to engage in both explor-
atory and exploitative behaviours (DeCarolis & Deeds,
1999; Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991); and (e) the limits
to managerial attention and organizational capacity to in-
dulge in both exploratory and exploitative behaviour implies
that organizations make trade-offs and tend to focus on one
or the other (Levinthal & March, 1993).
As noted, a firm’s ability to make sound resource
deployment decisions enables it to achieve congruence in
an uncertain environment. But evidence suggests that
achieving such congruence is not easy. Uncertainty places
unreasonable demands on the cognitive processing abilities
of managers and makes them prone to erratic decision-
making (Mitchell et al., 2011) at the very time when there
is a greater premium on sound resource deployment deci-
sions. In fact, Miller and Shamsie’s (1999) study establishes
that state, effect, and response uncertainty impairs resource-
deployment decisions by sending conflicting signals to
managers. Their study examined how different types of
uncertainties engendered different strategic responses from
Hollywood studios with regards to variety in their product
offerings between 1936 and 1965.
State uncertainty in Milliken’s (1987) formulation
pertains to the inability to make sense of the macro-level
environmental changes. For example, currently the conver-
gence of smart mobility, cloud computing, social network-
ing, and big data analytics has created a great deal of state
uncertainty in the technology sector. R&D investments
may assist in exploring and legitimizing the technologiesCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.that enable the potential of technological convergence to
solve problems that customers will ultimately pay for. Addi-
tionally, the regulatory regimes of different nation-states too
will play a role. For instance, national priorities may impact
the availability of sufficient bandwidth for the projected
number of Wi-Fi applications. The performance attributes
of some of these technologies are still developing and one
cannot predict how technological advances will effect indi-
vidual organizations. Thus effect uncertainty is also at play.
Unsurprisingly, the sector is witnessing higher than usual
merger and acquisition activity (EY News Release, 2012),
which indicates that organizations are deploying their re-
sources to prepare for an uncertain future. Eventually, the or-
ganizations must respond. For instance, traditional copper
wire telecommunication providers now must decide on the
segment of the emerging consumer multimedia market they
wish to compete in. The decision by the US telecom company
AT&T to leverage cloud computing and invest in video on
demand services (AT&T Newsroom, 2014) is a case in point.
Response uncertainty, as the AT&T example illustrates,
pertains to managers experiencing the pressure to respond
without being in a position to confidently predict the
outcomes or consequences of their decisions. It is almost
impossible for managers to foresee which technology will
eventually get profitability embedded in the technological
ecosystem. Thus, managerial decisions during such times
must necessarily be based on tentative projections. More
generally, the degree of confidence in the resource deploy-
ment decisions made by decision makers during state uncer-
tainty tends to be inversely proportional to the levels of
causal ambiguity experienced by them. Arguably, decision
making would improve if managers were to focus only on
a limited number of key variables. A sharper focus would
produce greater clarity around cause-effect linkages and
thereby diminish the levels of causal ambiguity experienced
by managers. In the next section, we build on the fact that
exploratory, as opposed to exploitative, activities have been
found effective during uncertain times. To facilitate greater
clarity, we attempt to link specific types of uncertainty with
specific exploratory activities.
Specific Types of Exploration for Specific Types of
Uncertainty
Exploration is “the pursuit of new knowledge, of things
that might come to be known” (Levinthal & March, 1993,
p. 104). While exploitation pertains to improving present
performance through incremental activities such as execu-
tion and process-refinement, exploration is more about
searching and experimenting new processes so as to effect
improvements in future performance (Levinthal & March,
1993). Lavie and colleagues (2013) have cited ample evi-
dence to support the assertion that exploration proves more
effective during uncertain times (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006;
Sidhu et al., 2004) than does exploitation (e.g., Gupta,Can J Adm Sci
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exploratory activities and uncertainty as a point of departure
and build on our intuition that it may pay dividends to
further analyze exploratory activities.
Prior research has found that a wide range of explor-
atory activities can lead to superior performance. The activ-
ities include, but are not limited to: the acquisition of
creative talent (e.g., Miller & Shamsie, 1996); accessing
and developing knowledge-based stocks by building ties
with partners (e.g., Stuart, 2000); allocating internal re-
sources for search and R&D (e.g., Li, 2013); and choosing
to locate in areas that facilitate access to knowledge and
knowledge spillovers (e.g., DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). A
closer examination of the above mentioned exploratory ac-
tivities reveal how the activities involve both technological
and social elements. Also, technology-related activities tend
to have an internal focus in that they concentrate on develop-
ing and exploring the potential of a technology, whereas
social activities have an external focus and pertain to the
process of understanding how to fit into a commercialization
ecosystem. This is consistent with the innovation literature
that draws attention to “the tension between external and
internal sources of innovation” (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010,
p. 1165). We contend below that there are theoretical rea-
sons to undertake technology-based exploratory activities
during state uncertainty and social network-based explor-
atory activities during response uncertainty.
Technological exploration and state uncertainty.We
define technological exploration as activities that are
focused on the pursuit of innovation through research and
development activities. During state uncertainty, all actors
immersed in the environment in question (i.e., the entire
industrial ecosystem) are equally “ignorant” and can do no
more than attempt to generate plausible future scenarios
and prepare for them to the extent possible. State uncertainty
creates doubt about the future prospects of existing product
lines and makes it difficult to predict which technologies will
eventually prevail. Under such circumstances, it makes
sense for decision makers to hedge their bets and focus on
broadening their firm’s knowledge base in the hopes of posi-
tioning it to seize an opportunity once there is more clarity.
Firms inclined to commit strategic resources for a major
new initiative during a period of state uncertainty must
necessarily take an ill-informed risk. We expect that inves-
tors will penalize firms for undertaking such unduly risky
initiatives and instead reward those undertaking more
conservative ones. They may see technological exploration,
especially high investments in R&D, as evidence that the
firm is working to cope with technological uncertainty.
The argument that attempts to explore or innovate
should be favoured during state uncertainty is somewhat
counter-intuitive. As Henderson (1999, p. 290) observed,
“Exploration involves inventing new technologies. Its finan-
cial returns are potentially large, but they are also risky and
tend to occur in the distant future…exploitation involves theCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.refinement of existing technologies. Its financial returns are
relatively certain and immediate…” Exploration is also said
to enhance an “organization’s future adaptability while
incurring greater risk and opportunity costs” (Lavie et al.,
2010, p. 137). Nonetheless, we argue that state uncertainty
prevents an estimate of opportunity costs as one cannot
ascertain which opportunities, if any, are foregone by the
firms. Thus technological exploration, especially as typified
by a focus on R&D activities, is a prudent option during
state uncertainty. In general, strategic management scholars
have argued that increases in R&D expenses positively
affect firm performance as they facilitate the introduction of
valuable innovations that fulfill previously unmet consumer
demands. This positive effect is particularly strong in
knowledge-intensive industries (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999).
A focus on innovation can be expected to pay off during
turbulent environments because in the face of hostility, firms
become better at executing their innovation strategies. Firms
which fail to innovate under such circumstances often find
their core competences becoming core rigidities (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) as Polaroid, the conventional photo technol-
ogy provider, discovered with the advent of digital image
capturing technologies. The Polaroid example indicates that
firms must respond as soon as the levels of state uncertainty
are lowered. It stands to reason that firms that move aggres-
sively to gain an early mover advantage would be rewarded
by the investor community during periods of response
uncertainty. Conversely, conservative firms that continue
investing heavily in R&D at the expense of seizing an
existing opportunity would be penalized. This is exactly
what Jakopin and Klein (2012) found. These authors
reported that incumbent copper wire telecommunication
players that took the risk and seized the opportunity to
operate mobile networks out-performed late entrants into
the sector across 149 countries. Extant evidence suggests that
technological exploration is particularly valuable in times of
state uncertainty when there is a lack of clarity on the extent
of environmental munificence, and when the market inter-
prets aggressive pursuit of R&D as a sign of a promising
product line. Thus, we posit:
H1: R&D intensity will have a positive relationship
with financial market performance in times of state
uncertainty but not in times of response uncertainty.
Social exploration and environmental uncertainty.
We define social exploration as activities that allow a firm to
source knowledge externally, concentrating on the process of
understanding how to fit into a commercialization ecosystem,
such as through the transfer of personnel or through social net-
works. Such networks have been closely linked to a firm’s
ability to innovate (see Gubbins & Dooley, 2014). We hold
that social exploration, whether consciously or otherwise, is
greatly facilitated in firms located in hot spots because locating
close to others enables sharing of tacit knowledge about theCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
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ables the firm to work out how to move from technological le-
gitimization to being a legitimate element of the technology
commercialization ecosystem. Thus, a hot spot location could
be taken as a proxy measure for social exploration. Hot spots
have been defined as “fast growing, geographically clustered
firms within industries” (Pouder & St. John, 1996, p. 1192).
Some examples of hot spots are: Bangalore and Hyderabad
in India for call centres; the Third-Italy region (a few towns
and cities in the north-east of Italy) for clothing and ceramics;
Saskatoon in Canada for its agricultural biotechnology firms;
Hollywood for its film-related industrial ecosystem; or Wall
Street for its finance industry.
A prominent feature of hot spots is the presence of an
extensive network of linkages between firms, which facili-
tate the transfer of knowledge through frequent and repeated
interactions that can in turn become a source of competitive
advantage (McCann & Folta, 2009; Pouder & St. John,
1996). The benefits of agglomeration of knowledge inten-
sive firms such as dotcoms are primarily supply side (see
McCann & Folta, 2009 for a review) and include: greater
access to sources of funds (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999);
access to a large pool of knowledge-workers; proximity to
complementary industries; and access to information on
emerging best practices in the industry (Kukalis, 2010). As
Marshall (1920) had observed almost a century ago, infor-
mation is almost in the air in geographic clusters. Even if
firms and managers do not consciously attempt to build
and leverage their social networks, they perhaps cannot help
benefitting from being located in hot spots. While the
generic benefits of a hot spot location are well understood
and acknowledged, little is known about how, if at all,
interaction effects between a hot spot location and types of
uncertainty impact firm performance.
In many ways, state uncertainty tends to level the
playing field and facilitates the entry of new players into
an industry. Incumbent firms, much like new entrants, must
deal with response uncertainty by deploying resources to
seize an opportunity. Arguing that opportunities in high un-
certainty environments can be fleeting and “opportunity only
favours the prepared,” Li, Chen, Liu, and Peng (2014, p, 272 )
reported that new ventures with stronger interfirm and man-
agerial ties display higher levels of exploratory learning and
are more successful at opportunity capture than are new ven-
ture firms with low levels of social capital. Another
empirical study on product innovation found that the two
phases of new product development—the initiation and the
implementation phase—respectively called for exploratory
and exploitative learning (Li, 2013). Overall, the initiation
phase may be seen as unfolding during a period of state
uncertainty and the implementation phase coinciding with
a period of response uncertainty. That firms prepare for the
initiation phase through undertaking internal exploratory ac-
tivities (e.g., R&D initiatives) is consistent with arguments
put forth in support of H1. Interestingly, the efficacy ofCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.exploitative learning during the implementation phase does
not necessarily undermine the importance of social explora-
tion during response uncertainty.
As Li (2013) pointed out, it is not as if exploration is not
needed during the implementation phase. This author
explained that exploitative learning during implementation
focuses mainly on competitor and market knowledge with a
view to ensuring superior product positioning in the market.
We argue that managerial networking in hot spots can help
firms gather the much-needed competitive and market intelli-
gence to complement exploitative learning during response
uncertainty. Furthermore, we note that well-developed social
networks in hotspots provide access to a diverse knowledge
base which can, in turn, contribute to superior problem
solving. Diverse inputs and ideas have been found to in-
crease the possibility of discovering novel linkages and
enhance the quality of strategic decision making (Matusik
& Fitza, 2012). Similarly, Combs, Ketchen, Ireland, and
Webb (2011) also implied that incumbent firms can cope
with response uncertainty by combining or bundling their
existing resources in new ways, or leveraging their re-
sources in entirely new domains. Again, we argue that so-
cial exploration would facilitate the kind of thinking
needed to respond in novel ways.
Our intuition that social exploration could help firms
cope with response uncertainty is supported by another
study that describes uncertainty as being either “collective”
or “firm-specific” (see Beckman et al., 2004). We argue that
major macro-economic changes and technological advances
as witnessed during state uncertainty can unsettle all firms
within a sector, irrespective of their geographical location.
Therefore, firms may be said to experience collective uncer-
tainty during state uncertainty. Having invested in their cho-
sen technologies and configured their resources uniquely,
firms eventually must respond by launching a particular
product or service as state uncertainty subsides. Therefore,
during response uncertainty, firms may be described as
facing firm-specific uncertainty. Beckman and colleagues re-
port that firms tend to rely on existing partners and internal
resources to cope with collective uncertainty, and that they
tend to broaden their ties with new friends as they attempt
to cope with firm-specific uncertainty. This suggests that
responsiveness in new environments calls for new partners.
The study in effect underlines the salience of exploration
facilitated by a hot spot location during response uncertainty
more than during “collective” state uncertainty. Thus:
H2(a): A geographic hot spot location will have a posi-
tive impact on a firm’s financial market performance
both in times of state uncertainty and response uncertainty.
H2(b): The positive effect of a geographic hot spot
location on a firm’s financial market performance will
be greater in times of response uncertainty than in
times of state uncertainty.Can J Adm Sci
(2015)
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Sample
We examined the effects of technological and social
exploration on firm financial market performance in the
context of the information technology sector in the United
States. Our data sources included the Compustat North
America annual database compiled by Standard & Poor’s,
company websites and press articles, and other documents
obtained using search criteria related to each firm. We
focused on firms operating in the Computer Programming,
Data Processing and Other Computer Related Services
industry group (SIC codes 7370–7379) and the Computers
and Computer Storage Devices group (SIC codes 3571,
3572 and 3575) in the time periods 1995–1998 and 2001–
2004. Our decision to focus on this research setting was
motivated by three factors. First, we needed to situate our
study in context where technology- and knowledge-based
exploration activities could be expected to impact firm finan-
cial market performance. Second, there is consensus that this
context is characterized by the presence of geographical
clusters or hot spots (McCann & Folta, 2008). Finally, this
setting was characterized by significant turbulence over the
sample period (see Figure 1).
Our original sample comprised 20,790 firm-years in the
period 1995–2004. We removed foreign-incorporated firms
trading as American Depository Receipts and all observa-
tions where three or more of our variables (e.g., assets, sales,
operating income, and shares outstanding) were missing or
equal to zero, as we considered this indicative of a firmFigure 1. NASDAQ Composite Index: 1995–2004
Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.being inactive. We also removed observations with less than
10 million dollars in revenues, which often belong to periph-
eral firms in the IT sector, leaving us with 6,279
observations. Next, we excluded 1,499 observations for the
period 1999–2000, which constitutes the height of the dotcom
bubble. Thus, our final sample comprises 4,780 firm-years.Dependent Variables
Drawing on prior literature, we used two measures of
firm financial market performance: Tobin’s q and market capi-
talization. This choice was motivated by the fact that emerging
technology firms do not generally have a history of revenues or
earnings (Trueman, Wong, & Zhang, 2000), which are among
the main determinants of conventional accounting-based
measures like return on assets or return on sales.
Tobin’s q, calculated as the ratio of the market value of
the assets of a firm and the book value of its assets, is fre-
quently used as an assessment of the financial performance
of firms (e.g., Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2007; Higgins
& Rodriguez, 2006). Tobin’s q has the benefit of being both
generally correlated with traditional measures of accounting
performance, such as return on assets and return on sales,
and also of capturing firms’ future financial performance
(Roberts, 1999). The other measure, market capitalization,
is calculated for each firm in any given year as the number
of shares outstanding multiplied by the share price at the
end of the last day of trading. Market capitalization is a
particularly valuable measure of the financial performance
of technology-intensive firms as it reflects investors’Can J Adm Sci
(2015)
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though they currently might not be generating any. For ex-
ample, DeCarolis and Deeds’ (1999) study of biotechnology
firms used market capitalization to measure firm perfor-
mance. The authors explained how the “fact that they are
years away from any significant revenue stream, have very
few tangible assets, are sustaining significant accounting
losses, and require large amounts of capital,” make market
capitalization a valid measure of the performance of these
firms (pp. 959–960). In our analysis, we used a logarithmic
transformation to control for the skewness of the distribution
of this variable.
And finally, we examined how our findings change
when we employed an accounting-based measure of perfor-
mance, namely a firm’s Return on Sales, calculated for each
fiscal year as operating earnings divided by total sales. Re-
turn on sales is frequently used as a measure of profitability
in dynamic contexts (e.g., Durand, Bruyaka, & Mangematin,
2008; McNamara, Peck, & Sasson, 2013). We had expected
the relationship between R&D intensity and return on sales
to be negative, as R&D is a current expense that tends to
suppress current profitability. Instead, in the longer term,
as a firm matures, the innovations generated by R&D ought
to result in increased profitability. The latter effect, which
was not readily captured by return on sales, was instead
captured by both Market Capitalization and Tobin’s q.
Operationalizing State and Response Uncertainty
Informed by reports from the popular press, we isolated
three periods—predotcom bubble, dotcom bubble, and
postdotcom bubble—to operationalize the three specific
types of uncertainty. There is general consensus amongst
financial analysts that 1999–2000 was the dotcom bubble
period. The market sentiment was highly erratic and the
period saw the bubble peaking and bursting (see Dai,
Shackelford, & Zhang, 2008). As stated earlier, for the pur-
poses of this study, we focused on the periods immediately
preceding and following the dotcom bubble period. For
reasons explained below, we took the predotcom bubble pe-
riod (1995–1998) to be a period of state uncertainty, and the
postdotcom period (2001–2004) to be a period of response
uncertainty.
State uncertainty (1995–98). This period was charac-
terized by widespread apprehension about whether the sector
would be successful. There was tremendous excitement
about technological developments, but no one seemed to
know what exactly was afoot. This uncertainty is supported
by a passage from History of the Internet (Peter, 2003) about
the period 1994–99:CopyFor the next five years we were to be bombarded with
sometimes realistic and often unrealistic visions of the
future; we heard of information superhighways, internet
refrigerators and cars, knowledge economies, internet
time and internet years, which were vastly different toright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.any time known before, and the dotcom frenzy. Not since
the South Sea Island bubble in the 1700s had western
economies experienced anything like the dotcom eco-
nomic bubble. Suddenly everyone wanted a piece of the
action; normally astute investors went crazy, and mums
and dads added to the frenzy. For some, the dotcom era
saw an amassing of great wealth. But almost overnight
it disappeared during 2000 and 2001. (para. 12, 13)Response Uncertainty (2001–04). During this period,
it became clear that the investor climate had irreversibly de-
teriorated, but there was little clarity on the decisions that
needed to be made. Firms in the IT sector needed to decide
on their reaction to a high-impact event—namely, the
dotcom bubble burst that had panicked the stock markets.
Inaction was not an option in an environment that was
witnessing consolidation, with the surviving players actively
scouting externally for promising technologies. By this time,
the implications of convergence of technologies, such as
computing, Wi-Fi, fibre optics, and communication net-
works, had become clearer. Firms could visualize the
possibilities, but did not know when and how to respond
(see Friedman, 2006). The uncertainty faced by IT firms
was compounded by the drastic change in regulatory regime,
which took place in 2002 with the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
Independent Variables
We measured technological exploration as R&D inten-
sity, calculated as firms’ annual R&D expenses divided by
sales (R&D/Sales). Measuring R&D intensity in this
standard manner allows us to control for the fact that firms
producing larger revenue streams are more likely to be able
to invest larger amounts in R&D than firms producing
smaller revenue streams. Prior studies observe how deleting
observations with missing R&D expenses is undesirable as it
skews the sample towards R&D-intensive firms, so these
observations are set equal to zero (Ciftci & Cready, 2011).
We measured the intensity of a firm’s social exploration
with a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in either
of the following states: California, Texas, Massachusetts, or
New York, or in the cities of Atlanta, Boston, New York,
Seattle, or Washington, and 0 otherwise (Hot spot location).
These areas were chosen as they have emerged as geo-
graphic hubs of information technology innovation within
the US (e.g., Pouder & St. John, 1996). This variable cap-
tures the effect on firm profitability of the knowledge spill-
overs occurring through the social interactions taking place
among technology-intensive firms located in these areas.
Control Variables
We also included in our analysis several variables that
could potentially affect a firm’s profitability. Size, measured
with the natural logarithm of total assets, is included amongCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.the controls, as is standard in the literature. Controlling for
the effect of size is all the more crucial when profitability
is measured using financial market measures (DeCarolis &
Deeds, 1999) such as in this case. Additionally, we also
included a measure of a firm’s age, expressed as the natural
logarithm of the number of years from the start of operations
(Age) to control for the fact that technology firms tend to
become more inertial as they mature (Van de Ven, Polley,
Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999), which in turn could nega-
tively affect their profitability. Also, while technological
and social exploration are the conceptual focus of this paper,
we recognize that from a resource-based perspective it is
possible for other resources and capabilities to be associated
with firm performance. Hence, we controlled for two key
sources of resource heterogeneity amongst firms. The first
source is the yearly values of a firm’s stock of intangible
assets, such as technological know-how, patents, brands,
and goodwill, expressed as a percentage of total assets
(Intangibles/Assets). The second source is the yearly values
of a firm’s property, plant, and equipment as a percentage
of total assets (PPE/Assets).
The Model
We used panel regressions to examine the relation
between environmental uncertainty, exploration type, and
firm performance. In the following model, the subscript i
identifies each single company in our sample and subscript
t identifies the year:
Performanceit ¼ β0 þ β1* R&D=Salesð Þit
þβ2*Hot spot locationit
þ β3* Intangible assets=Assetsð Þit þ
þβ4* PPE=Assetsð Þit þ β5*Sizeit
þβ6*Ageit þ β7*Performanceit1 þ eit
We estimated three different specifications of this model
where firm performance is measured with Tobin’s q, market
capitalization, and return on sales, respectively. The inde-
pendent and control variables are those defined above. We
also included a measure of firm performance in the prior
year (t-1) to avoid specification error in the models (Miller
& Shamsie, 1996). In order to mitigate the influence of
outliers, we Winsorized both tails of our dependent variables
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Our conclusions do not change
with or without Winsorization.Results
In order to confirm our theoretical speculation regarding
different kinds of uncertainty affecting the predotcom bubble
(1995–1998) and postdotcom bubble period (2001–2004),Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.we examined the year-to-year stability in our measures of
financial market performance. We conducted our investiga-
tion by calculating the correlation coefficients between each
of our measures of firm performance in year t and t-1, which
are reported in Table 1. In the first period, the inter-year
correlation for Tobin’s q, market capitalization, and return
on sales were equal to 47.2%, 73.2%, and 37.4%. In the
second period, they were 45.0%, 79.6%, and 58.6%, respec-
tively. Two out of three measures point to the second period
being more stable than the first. This evidence suggests that
the period 1995–1998 was characterized by greater uncer-
tainty and unpredictability regarding the future prospects of
the industry, a condition that fits the description of state
uncertainty as per Milliken (1987). While the period 2001–
2004 was less unpredictable, it showed itself to be an uncer-
tain period in the sense that managers of technology-intensive
firms struggled to understand and evaluate the range of
strategic responses available to deal with the dotcom bubble
burst. Thus, we argue that 2001–2004 fits the description of
response uncertainty.
Financial Market Performance and Exploration
Activities in Different Uncertainty Periods
Table 2 compares the performance and exploration
activities for the predotcom bubble/state uncertainty period
and the postdotcom bubble/response uncertainty period.
Firms exhibited generally lower Tobin’s q and return on
sales in the second period than in the first. For example,
the median Tobin’s q declined from 1.618 to 1.431 in the
postbubble period, while the median return on sales declined
from 8.644% to 3.565%. Conversely, when we measured
financial performance as market capitalization, the median
firm in the IT sector was more valuable in the postdotcom
bubble period than in the predotcom period (4.909 vs.
4.409). We believe that a key background phenomenon
underpinning these changes was a wave of consolidations
taking place in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble burst.
Indeed, in the prior period our sample included 878 firms,
while in the latter period it only included 745 firms. This
concentration activity is likely to have occurred as the hos-
tile environment posed greater challenges to firm survival,
causing weaker firms to go out of business or be acquired
by stronger ones. Median R&D expenses increased from
10.4% of total sales to 13.7% of total sales over the period
2001–2004. More observations in our sample are from firms
located in a hotspot in the postdotcom period than in the
predotcom period (37.8% vs. 32.3%). Thus, we can see that
there were considerable changes in both forms of explora-
tion over the period of the study.
Among our firm characteristics variables, firm size and
age increased significantly between the two periods. The
median size increased from 3.865 to 4.581, while the median
age increased from 2.485 to 2.708. These findings are con-
sistent with the view that the dotcom bubble burst hastenedCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
Table 1
Inter-Year Correlations between Firm Performance Measures by Uncertainty Type
Tobin’s q Lag Tobin’s q Market capitalization Lag market capitalization Return on sales Lag return on sales
State uncertainty: 1995-1998
Tobin’s q 1.00
Lag Tobin’s q 0.472*** 1.00
Market capitalization 0.590*** 0.457*** 1.00
Lag market capitalization 0.221*** 0.649*** 0.732*** 1.00
Return on sales 0.140*** 0.157*** 0.269*** 0.225*** 1.00
Lag return on sales 0.195*** 0.389*** 0.532*** 0.575*** 0.374*** 1.00
Response uncertainty: 2001-2004
Tobin’s q 1.00
Lag Tobin’s q 0.450*** 1.00
Market capitalization 0.409*** 0.370*** 1.00
Lag market capitalization 0.147*** 0.534*** 0.796*** 1.00
Return on sales 0.173*** 0.214*** 0.240*** 0.293*** 1.00
Lag return on sales 0.087*** 0.349*** 0.374*** 0.560*** 0.586*** 1.00
Note: ***indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%.
UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.a consolidation of the industry, ushering a more competi-
tive environment with fewer players who were older and
larger in size. Similarly, intangible assets as a fraction of
total assets rose from a median of 0% in the period
1995–1998 to 10.1% in the period 2001–2004. Finally,
we were unable to find a pattern in the value of property
plant and equipment as a percentage of total assets in
the two periods.Effect of Technological Exploration and Social
Exploration on Firm Performance
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients for our
measures in the periods 1995–1998 and 2001–2004. In
the state uncertainty period the correlation coefficient be-
tween Tobin’s q and R&D intensity was positive and sig-
nificant (0.091, p<0.01), and that between R&D intensity
and market capitalization was not significant. The correla-
tion coefficients in the response uncertainty period were
negative and significant for Tobin’s q (0.044, p<0.05)
and positive but not significant for market capitalization.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that technological
exploration tends to be advantageous for firms in times
of state uncertainty and to be neutral or at worst counter-
productive in periods of response uncertainty, thereby pro-
viding preliminary support for H1. As expected, return on
sales exhibited a negative correlation with R&D intensity
in both periods (0.352 and 0.522, p<0.01). The find-
ing that the negative correlation coefficient between
R&D intensity and return on sales for the second period
was stronger than it was for the first period also provides
some initial support for H1.Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Table 3 also shows that hot spot location was posi-
tively related to Tobin’s q and market capitalization in
both state uncertainty and response uncertainty. The corre-
lation coefficients are 0.059 and 0.055 (both p<0.01) for
Tobin’s q and 0.047 and 0.075 (p<0.05 and p<0.01) for
market capitalization. Not only was the correlation coeffi-
cient positive and significant in both periods, it was com-
parable or higher in the period after the dotcom bubble.
This evidence provides some preliminary support for H2
(a) and H2(b). When we used return on sales for a robust-
ness check, we noticed that the correlation coefficient be-
tween this measure and hot spot location was negative in
state uncertainty and not significant in response uncer-
tainty. A possible reason behind this finding is that firms
located in hot spots were relatively young and innovative
and invested more in R&D than did firms located every-
where else in the US, which negatively impacted their
income. Indeed, our analysis confirms that firms in hot
spots tend to be younger in both periods and have higher
R&D intensity.
Our univariate analysis provides some initial support for
H1, H2(a) and H2(b). We now examine the effects of tech-
nological and social exploration on firm performance in
times of state and response uncertainty in a multivariate
setting. The results of our panel regressions are presented
in Table 4. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q in models
(1) - (3), market capitalization in models (4) - (6), and return
on sales in models (6) - (9).
Frommodels (1) and (2) of Table 4 we see that when firm
performance was measured using Tobin’s q, the effect of tech-
nological exploration was positive in the period 1995–1998
(p<0.10) and negative and significant in the period 2001–
2004 (p<0.01). Social exploration as measured with firms’Can J Adm Sci
(2015)
Table 2
Financial Market Performance, Exploration Type, and
Firm Characteristics by Uncertainty Type
Uncertainty type
State: 1995–1998
N=2,502
Response: 2001–2004
N=2,278
t-test/z-test
Pre-Post
Performance:
Tobin’s q
Mean 2.441 1.865 9.57***
Median 1.618 1.431 4.89***
Market capitalization
Mean 4.189 4.738 8.16***
Median 4.409 4.909 7.72***
Return on sales
Mean 1.820 7.123 9.17***
Median 8.644 3.565 10.47***
Type of exploration:
Technological: R&D/Sales
Mean 0.141 0.167 4.07***
Median 0.104 0.137 6.07***
Social: Hot spot location
Mean 0.323 0.378 3.98***
Median 0.000 0.000 3.98***
Firm characteristics
Size
Mean 4.127 4.753 12.95***
Median 3.865 4.581 13.68***
Age
Mean 2.409 2.610 9.87***
Median 2.485 2.708 8.93***
Intangible assets/Assets
Mean 0.053 0.168 25.52***
Median 0.000 0.101 28.60***
PPE/Assets
Mean 0.278 0.299 2.81***
Median 0.219 0.223 1.01
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.location in a hot spot was not significantly associated with firm
performance in the prebubble period. However, it was instead
positively associated with performance in the postbubble pe-
riod (p<0.05). These findings are partially consistent with
H2(b). Model (3) provides a more stringent test of our hypoth-
eses as it tests for the moderating effect of the type of uncer-
tainty on the relation between R&D intensity and hot spot
location on Tobin’s q. In the model, R&D/Sales was positive,
indicating that technological exploration is associated with a
higher Tobin’s q in state uncertainty. The coefficient on
R&D/Sales x Response was negative, consistent with a nega-
tive effect of technological exploration on Tobin’s q in re-
sponse uncertainty. The effect of Hot spot location wasCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.positive. This result is consistent with a positive effect of so-
cial exploration in state uncertainty. The coefficient on Hot
spot location x Response is not significant. Thus Model 3 sup-
ports H1 and H2(a) but not H2(b). Based on our correlation
analysis, we speculate that the negative sign onHot spot loca-
tion x Response in Model 3 could be due to the fact that the
correlation between Tobin’s q andHot spot location is positive
but small while that between Tobin’s q and Response is nega-
tive and sizeable.
In models (4) - (6) our dependent variable is financial
market performance as measured by market capitalization.
R&D intensity has a positive impact on prebubble market
capitalization (p<0.01). This effect, however, becomes
negative in the postbubble period, similar to the case of
models (1) and (2). In contrast, the coefficient on hot spot lo-
cation was not significant in the prebubble period but it be-
came positive in the postbubble period. This evidence
lends support to H1 and partial support to H2(b). In model
(6), R&D/Sales was once again positive, consistent with a
positive effect of technological exploration in state uncer-
tainty. The interaction term R&D/Sales x Response was in-
stead negative, a finding suggestive of a negative effect of
R&D intensity on market capitalization in response uncer-
tainty. Taken together, these results are consistent with H1.
Hot spot location and Hot spot location x Response did
not have a significant effect on market capitalization. Thus,
Model 6 does not support H2(a) and H2(b).
Finally, models (7) - (9) show that when we measured
firm performance using return on sales, the coefficient on
R&D intensity was negative in both periods, as expected in
light of the arguments presented above. The coefficient on
hot spot location instead was negative in the first period
(p<0.10) but not significant in the second. We also noticed
how the coefficient on R&D intensity became more negative
in the second period while the coefficient on hot spot location
became more positive. Thus, we interpreted these findings as
being broadly consistent withH1 andH2(b). In model (9), the
coefficient on R&D/Sales was negative, consistent with a
negative effect of technological exploration in state uncer-
tainty. The interaction term R&D/Sales x Response was also
negative. This finding indicates that R&D intensity has a
more negative effect on market capitalization in response un-
certainty, consistent with the prediction ofH1. The coefficients
on Hot spot location and Hot spot location x Response were
not significant. Thus H2(a) and H2(b) are not supported.Discussion
Summary
We offered a theoretical rationale anchored in the
knowledge-based view of the firm and the organizational
learning literature for the effect of different types of knowl-
edge resources on firm performance in specific types ofCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
Table 3
Correlation Coefficients by Uncertainty Type
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
State uncertainty: 1995-1998
1. Tobin’s Q 1.00
2. Market capitalization 0.590*** 1.00
3. Return on sales 0.140*** 0.270*** 1.00
4. R&D/Sales 0.091*** 0.022 0.352*** 1.00
5. Hot spot location 0.059*** 0.047** 0.038* 0.037* 1.00
6. Size 0.160*** 0.744*** 0.247*** 0.060*** 0.041** 1.00
7. Age 0.070*** 0.205*** 0.283*** 0.167*** 0.08*** 0.255*** 1.00
8. Intangible assets/Assets 0.080*** 0.012 0.006 0.081*** 0.048** 0.077*** 0.043** 1.00
9. PPE/Assets 0.143*** 0.097*** 0.043** 0.039** 0.031 0.025 0.173*** 0.094*** 1.00
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Response uncertainty 2001-2004
1. Tobin’s Q 1.00
2. Market capitalization 0. 409*** 1.00
3. Return on sales 0.173*** 0.240*** 1.00
4. R&D/Sales 0.044** 0.005 0.522*** 1.00
5. Hot spot location 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.014 0.043** 1.00
6. Size 0.039* 0.806*** 0.232*** 0.011 0.058*** 1.00
7. Age 0.043** 0.170*** 0.313*** 0.203*** 0.139*** 0.190*** 1.00
8. Intangible assets/Assets 0.094*** 0.064*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.147*** 0.023 1.00
9 PPE/Assets 0.023 0.237*** 0.047** 0.074*** 0.110*** 0.234*** 0.034 0.222*** 1.00
Note: ***, **and *indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.uncertainty. We also provided some empirical evidence in
support of our arguments. Overall, our results suggest that
technological exploration through investment in R&D is
positively associated with a firm’s financial performance in
times of state uncertainty, but not in times of response
uncertainty. Further, we found mixed evidence on the effect
of social exploration, as facilitated through a hot spot loca-
tion, on a firm’s financial performance during state and
response uncertainty.Contributions to Scholarship
The RBV has been criticized for ignoring where, when,
and how resources become useful (Priem & Butler, 2001).
Our study offered some answers by indicating that the effec-
tiveness of specific exploratory resources may be contingent
upon specific types of uncertainty. We also implied that there
may be a way to address what has been described in the liter-
ature as the causal ambiguity paradox (King & Zeithaml,
2001). The extant literature cautions that while knowledge-
based resources can help firms cope with uncertainty (e.g.,
Miller & Shamsie, 1996), the resources, being inherently
complex (Barney, 1985), can prove double-edged. So, the re-
sources may render competitive imitation difficult, but by the
same token, they can prevent managers of the focal firm from
understanding cause-effect relationships. Our results imply
that scholars can help overcome the causal ambiguityCopyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.paradox and enhance the validity of managerial decisions
by developing fine-grained taxonomies of not only resource
types, but also of resource deployment strategies. We believe
that our results provide some support for the intuition that
firm-level resource deployment decisions may be better un-
derstood by narrowing one’s focus.
It is worth noting that conceptually, the need to closely
match specific types of knowledge-based resources with
specific types of uncertainty to facilitate new learning and
positively impact firm performance resonates with Ashby’s
(1958) law of requisite variety, which posits that a system
can survive only if its internal complexity levels match the
complexity levels in its external environment. Finally, we
believe that our study also introduced an innovative way of
measuring constructs that are of interest to scholars. The study
demonstrates how one might obviate the need to rely on
subjective self-reported managerial responses by using hot
spot location and R&D investment as proxy measures for
social exploration and technological exploration respectively.Applied Implications
Our results imply that when and where possible, firms
should establish their operations in a hot spot location.
Furthermore, while we have argued that the mere presence
at a hot spot would pay dividends during times of response
uncertainty, our logic implies that firms that proactivelyCan J Adm Sci
(2015)
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UNPACKING THE EFFECT OF EXLPORATION SHRIVASTAVA ET AL.allocate resources to build managerial- and firm-level social
networks (through research alliances, hosting industry-level
seminars, and so forth) would out-perform the less proactive
firms. From a firm’s perspective, it bears reiteration that it
must simultaneously deploy resources for both exploration
and exploitation. Our study highlights that there may be
contingencies under which the emphasis on either ought to
shift. In effect, we recommend that firms should retain the
flexibility to rapidly redeploy their resources as the nature
of uncertainty changes. This further suggests the need for
retaining some organizational slack at all times.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, while our
study circumvents the need to rely on managers’ subjective
assessment of environmental uncertainty, it implicitly as-
sumes that in each period managers mainly experience only
a certain type of uncertainty. However, it appears reasonable
that managers could simultaneously experience several types
of uncertainty. Moreover, it does not explicitly consider that
managerial perceptions could also get influenced by organi-
zational characteristics. For instance, managers who have
greater confidence in their organization’s strategic planning
processes may not perceive response uncertainty as acutely
as their counterparts from other poorly-prepared organiza-
tions (Ashill & Jobber, 2010). Secondly, clusters differ in
terms of their geographical signatures (i.e., size, economic
diversity, and innovativeness) (e.g., Bell & Deng, 2013).
Scholars should consider teasing apart the characteristics of
clusters and study how variations between and within
clusters moderate the relationship between the types of
uncertainty and firm performance. Our study suggests that
it might prove fruitful to develop nomological networks
linking technological exploration, hot spot location, and
resource structuring in the context of coping with specific
types of uncertainty. Thirdly, researchers have conceptual-
ized exploration and exploitation as being part a resource
deployment continuum and that, irrespective of where a firm
is at a given point in time, it must retain the ability to situate
itself in the midpoint (e.g., Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004;
Lavie et al., 2010). Thus, future studies might find it fruitful
to examine how the effect of different types of exploration
and exploitation strategies on firm performance varies de-
pending on the type of environmental uncertainty. Fourthly,
our arguments need be further developed and tested across
different industries and different stages of the industry life
cycle. And finally, as we relied on secondary data we were
unable to control for potential confounding effects by in-
cluding other variables that might impact the performance
of the IT firms in our sample such as a firm’s strategy and
human resource orientation. Future studies could augment
our findings by using survey instruments to minimize sub-
jectivity in deriving relevant measures when not publicly
available.Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.JEL Classifications: D81, M00, L10References
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